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CASE COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW--CORPORATIONS--STATE DENIED STANDING
TO SUE FOR INJURY TO FOREIGN CORPORATION

The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.,
(hereinafter referred to as Barcelona Traction) was incorporated under Canadian law in 1911 with its main office in
Toronto. Several subsidiaries were formed, all under
Canadian law, to develop, produce, and distribute electric
power in the vicinity of Catalonia, Spain. To finance these
operations, the company issued both peseta and sterling
bonds, the shares in some of the subsidiaries providing
security to a Canadian bank for the sterling bonds. Revenue
produced by the subsidiaries from their operations in Spain
was used to service the bond interest. Servicing was suspended for the duration of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1940
but was resumed on the peseta bonds after the war. Barcelona
Traction was unable to resume payments on the sterling bonds
because the Spanish government would not permit the subsidiaries to convert their domestic revenue into foreign
exchange. The reason offered by the Spanish government was
that it could not be shown that this foreign currency was
needed to repay a debt arising out of an importation of
foreign capital into Spain. Complaints were tendered and
negotiations initiated by Canada, the parent nation of
Barcelona Traction, and Belgium, whose nationals owned
approximately 88% of the shares of Barcelona Traction. These
efforts were of no avail, and in 1948 three Spanish holders
of sterling bonds petitioned a Spanish court to declare
Barcelona Traction bankrupt for failure to make its interest
payments. The court, without providing notice of its
proceedings to any party outside Spain, appointed a receiver
and seized the assets of the company and its subsidiaries
in Spain. In 1949 the creditors elected trustees in bankruptcy who reorganized the company with a new headquarters
located in Spain. New shar s were printed and sold in 1952
at public auction to FECSA, a Spanish corporation.

1.

Fuerzas Electricas de Cataluna, S. A.

Great Britain, the United States, Canada, and Belgium
made representation to the Spanish government on behalf of
Barcelona Traction in 1948 following the declaration of
bankruptcy. Originally, Great Britain was concerned only
with the interests of British bondholders, but it subsequently supported the Canadian claims. The United States
submitted its representation upon the request of the
Canadian government and took no active part in the negotiations. The United States merely attempted to promote
eventual settlement. Canada pressed its claim through
official notes from 1948 to 1952. However, the enthusiasm
with which these attempts were made waned early and led to
a gradual diminishing of efforts which culminated in withdrawal from the affair in 1955. As early as 1951 the
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs was reported as having told the Spanish Consul in Canada that
"Canadian interests in this case are so slight that it is
of little interest to us. ''2 Belgium was much more aggressive
in pursuing its complaint, as was expected since the property
taken was owned predominately by Belgians. After making
ineffectual formal complaints and a suggestion of arbitration,
Belgium unilaterally referred the matter to the International
Court of Justice in 1962. In 1964 the action was suspended,
pending fLrther action in Spanish courts, but was reopened
in 1966. In reaching a decision in 1970, the Court avoided
the merits and denied Belgium standing to sue. The Court
held that in the absence of a small number of exceptional
circumstances, no nation, other than that in which an
enterprise is incorporated, may represent a cause of action
before the I.C.J. arising out of an injury to that corporation.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case (Second Phase),
[1970] I.C.J. 3, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 227 (1970).
This decision completes the I.C.J.'s definition of the
right of a nation to represent one of its nationals in the
international forum. In the Nottebohm Case 3 the Court had
previously held that a nation could protect any person who
was a citizen of that nation by birth or by blood, or who
had been naturalized and possessed a real and effective

2. As quoted in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.
Case (Preliminary Objections), [1964] I.C.J. 61-62.
3. Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), [1955] I.C.J. 4.

nationality in that nation. A sovereign would be allowed,
therefore, to protect an individual in an international
court only if there existed a somewhat greater connection
than mere formal citizenship; this connection had to be
sufficiently close to create a "genuine link" between the
sovereign and its citizen. The Nottebohm decision did not
apply to the right of a sovereign to protect a corporation,
and until the instant decision there was no clear statement
of international law on the question.
Because a corporation is a legal fiction, there are
two basic problems in considering which nation has the
right to protect the corporation. Firstit must be
determined where the corporation exists. Second, it must be
determined whether the place of corporate existence is also
the place of corporate nationality. Of course the corporation
has an existence in the nation in which it is incorporated
but, as in the instant case, that nation may not be inclined
to extend its diplomatic protection and representation
to this fictitious entity if the corporation has an effectively foreign character.
Countries other than the nation
of incorporation may have closer "links" with the corporation,
especially if a substantial percentage of the owners or
directors of the corporation is of an allegiance foreign
to that of the incorporating nation, or if the real seat of
control or the situs of operations is located outside of
the incorporating nation. Allowing any of these nations to
protect the corporation, however, could lead to chaos because
the number of countries possessing these rights might change
frequently due to the mobility of the operations, officers,
and directors of the business or the free transferability
of its stock. Perhaps because of the lack of a clearly
meritorious solution, no single theory of corporate nationality
has obtained a consensus among nations. 5 Ordinarily, a
corporation is presumed to have an independent existence,
the protection and regulation of which is accorded to the
nation creating this existence. 6 Yet nations for varying

4. Jones, Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who Are Shareholders in Foreign Companies, 26 BRIT, Y.B. INT'L L. 225,
236-37 (1949).
5. Id. at 237.
6. "The doctrine that the nationality of a company for
the purposes of International Law is, irrespective of the
nationality of the shareholders, that of the country under

reasons articulate exceptior to this general rule. For
example, under municipal law many civil law countries will
pierce the corporate veil and ascertain the siege social
of the corporation in order to prevent avoidance of domestic
laws. 7 Conversely, a nation might decide that a domestically
incorporated enterprise was actually of foreign nationality
for reasons relating to national security.8 International
arbitral reports indicate th. some nations will attempt
to extend the right to protect their citizens by claiming
a right to recover for an injury inflicted upon a foreign
corporation owned by these citizens. These nations disregard the place of incorporation as the exclusive test
for determining corporate nationality. This is the view of
Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and, at times,
the United States and Great Britain. 9 The latter two

whose law it is incorporated is the one which, it seems to
me, is now really firmly established." Beckett, Diplomatic
Claims in Respect of Injuries to Companies, 17 TRANS. GROTIUS
SOC'Y 175, 185 (1932) (footnotes omitted); see Note, Piercing
the Corporate Veil Under International Law, 16 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 779, 784 (1965).
7. The siege social is the true center of corporate
activity. See Harris, The Protection of Companies in International Law in the Light of the Nottebohm Case, 18 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 275, 280 (1969). Common law countries also deviate
from the general rule. The English case of Foss v. Harbottle
articulated an exception to the rule which applied when the
directors committed a fraud, or a breach of trust, or failed
to take steps necessary to protect the corporation. It also
established an exception in the case of any act ultra vires.
This exception had the effect of allowing the shareholders to
take independent action for injuries to the corporate entity.
Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843). While
in the United States a domestic corporation is generally
recognized as a being entitled to the protection of any
United States citizen, the Department of State will not extend
diplomatic representation on behalf of the corporation unless
it is at least 50% beneficially owned by U.S. shareholders.
P. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY
NATIONAL COMMISSIONS 86-94 (1962).
8. Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., [1916]
2 A.C. 307, 344 (English subsidiary of a German parent
corporation held to have German nationality).
9. Harris, supra note 7, at 299-305.

nations are usually proponents of the "place of location"
rule, but in past international arbitrations both have
chosen whichever concept was most expedient, 10 regardless
of its consistency with any general rule. Thus, the United
States has claimed the right to protect both a corporation
organized under its domestic law and a U. S. citizen injured
as a result o a wrongful act committed against a foreign
corporation.
Many of these latter claims were made in
arbitrations with Latin American nations 1 2 which frequently
demand a stipulation of domestic incorporation as a prerequisite for doing business in the country. 1 3 These
arbitrations are cited often as indicators of the development
of international law in this area, but their utility is
limited for several reasons: first, some were decided in
accordance with treaties; 1 4 second, many avoid any findings
on the question of standing and simply announce a final
award to one of the nations involved; 1 5 and three, most
involve a situation in which no concurrent right of
representation existed in the nation of incorporation
because that nation was the one charged with committing
the wrong. 1 6 Cases decided by the World Court, both prior
to and after the Nottebohm decision, appear to assume that
the nation of incorporation has a right of representation on
the basis of that connection alone. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company Case 1 7 Great Britain was given standing to sue after

10.
11.
12,

Harris, supra note 7, at 286.
Harris, supra note 7,at 301-04.
For a discussion of these arbitrations see, G. KIGHT,

TREATMENT OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS 3161 (1938).
The most significant, the Delaoa Bay Ry. arbitration, is discussed at note 20 infra and accompanying text.
13. E.g., El Triunfo Claim (United States v. El Salvador),
6 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 649 (1906)[hereinafter
cited as 6 MOORE, DIGEST],
[1902] PAPERS RELATING TO THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 838 (1903)[hereinafter

cited as FOR. REL. U.S.], 15 U.N.RoI.A.A. 455, 467 (1902).
14. See Romano-Americana Claim (United States v. Great
Britain), 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 840, 843
(1943) [hereinafter cited as 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST], [1926] 2
FOR. REL. U.S. 308 (1941), Jones, supra note 4, at 240, 253.
15.

Cf. Jones, supra note 4,

16.
17.

See Jones, supra note 4, at 254-55.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1952] I.CoJ.

at 237,

243.

93.

showing that the injured corporation was incorporated in
England. In determining the nationality of a corporation,
the Court in the Interhandel Case (post-Nottebohm) referred
to the injured corporation as the "Swiss company" after
Switzerland claimed the corporation was of Swiss nationality.1 8
The only significance to be drawn from the consideration of
nationality in these cases is that the International Court
of Justice had not given serious attention to the question
resolved in the instant case and therefore did not have any
established policy or practice from which to draw when
Spain challenged Belgium's standing to sue on behalf of
a company incorporated in Canada.
By a vote of fifteen to one (Judgead hoc Riphagen,
from Belgium, dissenting) the Court denied Belgium the right
to represent Barcelona Traction because that right was
vested only in the nation where the company was organized.
Several exceptions were recongized, but none was found to
apply in this case. In first facing the choice of law question,
the Court found no applicable treaty and determined customary
international law to be controlling. Such customary international law was silent on the distinguishing characteristics
of the corporate form in the international community. The
Court examined municipal law and, by analogy, adopted its
principles as international law. It was noted that the most
distinguishing feature of a corporation in municipal law
was its independent legal personality. This independent
personality allowed the owners of the corporation to enjoy
limited liability for the obligations of the business, but
gave them only limited rights in the operation of the
corporation and in the remedies available in case of injury
inflicted upon the business. Although a shareholder's
interest in the economic welfare of the corporation was
definitely affected when the corporation was injured, the
injury directly affected only the corporation. The shareholder suffered only a derivative injury, and the corporation
alone had the right to pursue legal redress.
The Court applied this logic to the law of nations
and held that only the nation in which the corporation was
formed had a right to maintain an action arising out of an
injury to that corporation. The injured interests on the
part of citizens of many other nations were disregarded.

18.

Interhandel Case, 11959] I.C.J. 6.

This basic rule has exceptions, of course, just as
municipal law has exceptions to its rule in order to
prevent abuse of the corporate structure. Municipal law
will "lift the corporate veil" for the benefit of shareholders but only when the directors of the corporation are
guiLty of mismanagement or when similar cases warrant
extraordinary relief. The Court mentioned several situations
that might arise at an international level and give a
nation, other than the nation of incorporation, a right to
protect the corporation. For example, if the corporation
ceased to exist, the country in which it was created would
have no national left to protect. Therefore, protection
could be tendered by the nations of the shareholders. Belgium
argued that Barcelona Traction was "practically defunct" 1 9
as a result of the Spanish expropriation, but the Court said
this description lacked legal precision and could not override the fact that the company was still technically in
existence in Canada. In dismissing this argument, the
Court overruled the old, but influential, arbitration
decision in the Delagoa Bay Ry. Case. 2 0 The Court conceded
that Belgium would have standing in this case if Canada
could not take the action necessary to protect the interests
of the corporation. This exception would have been applicable
if the nation of incorporation had also been the nation
committing the alleged wrong. Or, this exception might have
applied if there had been an insufficient link connecting the
country with standing and the corporation. On this point
19. This term was used persuasively in the Delagoa Bay
2Z. arbitration. 6 MOORE, DIGEST 648.
20. Delagoa Bay Ry. Case (Great Britain & United States v.
Portugal), 2 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 1865
(1898), 6 MOORE, DIGEST 647 (state may present a claim on
behalf of a shareholder-national who is injured by an act of
a foreign state against a foreign corporation); see [1902]
FOR. REL. U.S. 848-52 (1903). A similar argument, citing
Delagoa Bay Ry. as authority, was made in the Romano-Americana
Claim, supra note 14, at 840. More recently, the United States
recognized the creation of a cause of action in U.S. citizens
when Cuba expropriated property belonging to a Cuban corporation
that was 90% owned by American shareholders. Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 956 (1968).

the Court restated what it classified as the traditional
rule -- that the right of diplomatic protection adhered to

the nation in which the registered office of the corporation
was located or under whose laws the corporation was
created. The Court proceeded to note, however, that some
states require a greater link between the corporation and
its protecting state. Reference was made to the practice
in civil law states of ascertaining the siege social of a
corporation and establishing the right of diplomatic protection
only in the nation qualifying under that analytical test.
But, under either the common law or civil law tests there
was a right in Canada to represent Barcelona Traction, and
this was sufficient to eliminate a concurrent right in Belgium.
Both Spain and Belgium argued that an application of the
rule in the Nottebohm Case, which required a "genuine link"
or "nexus" between a naturalized citizen and the state in
order for the state to have a right of protection, would
result in a favorable decision to them. The Court dismissed
these arguments and found no factual or legal basis for
analogizing the Nottebohm decision to the instant case.
Having exhausted its possibilities under municipal law,
Belgium attempted to obtain standing by showing injury to
its economy as a result of the Spanish action, thereby
creating a direct injury to Belgian sovereignty. The
Court dismissed this argument by reiterating its distinction
between an injury to an interest and an injury to a right.
Whereas Belgium had suffered no injury to a right as
Canada possibly had Canada still possessed the exclusive right
to represent Barcelona Traction in an action against Spain.
Canada's unwillingness since 1955 to exercise this right
was merely one of its prerogatives as a sovereign.
Belgium's final argument, upon principles of equity,
was also rejected. The Court viewed the application of
equity in international law as a means of deviating from
the letter of the law to be used only when necessary to
avoid an unreasonable outcome. Here one of the consequences
of granting standing to Belgium would be to create a
dangerous precedent which might permit similar future claims
from a multitude of nations and breed insecurity among
lesser developed nations which desire to promote internal
investment of foreign capital.

The holding of the majority was hardly an expression
of unified sentiments. Eight judges filed separate opinions,
one judge dissented, and two submitted a joint declaration
in which they voiced apprehension over the use of language
although that case had been
found in the Nottebohm Case
21
expressly distinguished.
Judge Fitzmaurice was displeased with the majority
decision becuase he felt it was decided upon a technicality
and did not extend its analogy to municipal law far enough.
He referred to the instances in which the shareholders
could lift the corporate veil and sue for a wrong done to
the company. If international law was to remain faithful
to the analogy, it should give the government of the shareholders a right to sue when the government of the corporation
refused to pursue an action to obtain redress for injury
to the corporation. Fitzmaurice suggested that the failure
of international law to provide adequate remedies in such a
situation as found in the instant case signified a lack of
development as a legal system. The right to sue in behalf
of national shareholders should be extended in international
law more frequently than under municipal law because the
company's government is not under the duty to act in the best
interests of the company yet the management of the company
is obligated to act in furtherance of the best interests of
the shareholders. Therefore, Fitzmaurice would prefer to see
the nation of incorporation have something less than an
exclusive right of representation of the corporation; providing
protection for the corporation when the nation with the first
right to represent it chooses not to exercise that right would
be more realistic and would advance the development of the
fledgling system of international law.
Judge Tanaka, in another separate opinion concerning
protection of the parties actually injured by the wrongful

21. Separate opinions were filed by the following judges:
President Bustamante y Rivero (Brazil); Gros (France); Morelli
(Italy); Tanaka (Japan); Ammoun (Lebanon); Padilla Nervo (Mexico);
The
Fitzmaurice (Great Britain); and Jessup (United States).
dissenting opinion was filed by Judge ad hoc Riphagen (Belgium),
and a joint qualifying declaration was submitted by Judges
Oneyeama (Nigeria) and Petren (Sweden).

act in question, agreed with the majority premise that
the national state of the corporation should have the
right, above that of the nation of the shareholders, to
protect the corporation. He thought, however, that the
Court should take a more flexible approach toward recognizing
alternative rights of representation when the bond of
nationality between the company and its nation of incorporation
was not effective. For example, if the state of incorporation
chooses not to bring an action against the wrongdoing
state, then the nation of the shareholders would inherit
this right. Tanaka would extend this right even when the
corporation was composed of shareholders of diverse nationalities; the rights of diplomatic protection would exist
concurrently until judgment was rendered or satisfaction
obtained. At that time all other rights would be extinguished.
Independent rights would spring into existence when it
appeared either legally or factually that the national
state of the company could not be expected to exercise its
right to protect the company.
Tanaka saw no reason why international law could not
recognize a right of protection of the shareholders of a
company when the company is injured regardless of any right
of protection of the company. It is not necessary to
limit the granting of such a right to exceptional circumstances.
He also saw a practical answer to Spain's contention that
Belgium had not exhausted its local remedies in Spanish
courts before submitting this case to the International
Court of Justice. This prerequisite must have been satisfied
since Barcelona Traction had pursued the action far enough
to obtain 531 judgments by Spanish courts. The only reason,
therefore, that Tanaka did not dissent was that he was
hesitant to accuse any nation or its court system of denying
justice to a party. In order to warrant such a description,
the actions of the Spanish courts must have been motivated
by bad faith. This serious charge was not founded sufficiently
by the Belgian allegations to justify a dissent.
The lengthiest, and least harmonious opinion was
submitted by Judge Jessup. He agreed that under the
allegations set forth, Belgium had no right of diplomatic
protection because that nation's failure to produce evidence
tended to prove its claim that a substantial number of the
owners of Barcelona Traction were Belgian nationals. This
opinion repudiated the existence of any right of diplomatic

protection in Canada. Jessup did, however, recognize the
right of a state to extend its protection to a corporation
possessing its nationality. The first crucial question
posed by Jessup was how the court should determine the
nationality of a corporation. Several methods, including
the siege social, control, and location of incorporation
tests were mentioned, but no discussion was included until
the link theory was introduced. Here Jessup suggested
that the link joining the corporation and its national
state should be one which establishes a real and serious
connection between the two parties. This was done in the
Nottebohm Case with regard to natural persons and could
very easily be applied to corporationsthrough the process
known as "lifting the veil." By this means the scant connection existing between a corporation and a nation as a
result of a "charter of convenience" could be identified
and the right of diplomatic protection awarded on a more
substantial ground.
The term "charter of convenience" is
a direct allusion to the nautical counterpart, the "flag
of convenience," which is encouraged by nations with
permissive and relatively inexpensive ship registration
laws. 2 2 It is the practice of international law to disregard
any one of these "Panlibhon"23 flagsas conclusive proof
of nationality and to require a more penetrating examination

22. A flag of convenience is defined as the "flag of any
country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreigncontrolled vessels under conditions which, for whatever the
reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who
are registering the vessels." B.BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
2 (1962).
23. The term "Panlibhon" refers to Panama, Liberia, and
Honduras, all of which have liberal registration laws for
merchant vessels and allow clear financial advantages to
the owners of the vessels. For a discussion of this topic
see, Note, PANLIBHON Registration of American-Owned Merchant
Ships: Government Policy and the Problem of the Courts, 60
COLUM. L. REV. 711 (1960). For a discussion of similar
practices in the field of corporations see, E. ROLDE,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 249 (1968). For facility
in comparison, descriptions of some of the factors affecting
the ultimate decision of whether to incorporate in Belgium
(ch. 4), Canada (ch. 7), or Spain (ch. 30) may be found in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (W. Friedmann ed. 1959).

into the true nationality of the vessel. Jessup was of the
opinion that the application of this inquiry into the true
identity of a corporation would be the same as the practice
of lifting the corporate veil. 2 4 Furthermore, he noted that
to lift the veil in this case would reveal no genuine connection
between Canada and Barcelona Traction because the company
was essentially a holding company with its operative
elements in Spain and its owners in Belgium. Notably, all
the planning involved in the management of the company came
from Belgium.
As an alternative to examining the nationality of the
corporation, Jessup proposed that the court determine which
nations had interests that were involved. This approach
had been used previously by the United States before several
arbitration tribunals. Anticipating a question which might
arise in a situation where protection was available to two or
more countries, Jessup pointed out that double protection
already existed in the case of an employee of the United
Nations and that multiple protection had existed in cases
decided by arbitration tribunals in the Delagoa Bay R., 25
Tlahualilo, 2 6 and Mexican Eagle Oil Co. cases.27
Jessup criticized the decision reached by the Court
because it led to an irrational result. He questioned
who would be awarded diplomatic protection of a multi-national
consortium in which the enterprise was a combination of
businesses from various nations, no one of which held a
majority interest in the overall operation. Finally, Jessup
found no standing on the part of Belgium because that nation
had not shown that its nationals had a sufficient interest
in Barcelona Traction to warrant a right of diplomatic

24. Judge Jessup wanted to apply the "link theory" of
the Nottebohm Case to naturalized persons, ships, and
corporations. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Case,
9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 227, 309 (1970); cf. Jessup, The
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 COLUM. L.
REV. 234, 256 (1959).
25. Delagoa Bay Ry. Case, supra note 20.
26. Tlahualilo Case (Great Britain v. Mexico), [1913]
FOR. REL. U.S. 993 (1919).
27. Mexican Eagle Oil Co. Case (Great Britain v.
Mexico), 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1272
(1967). See also Jones, supra note 4, at 241-42.
63

protection. This was strictly a failure to meet the
requirements of evidence. This technicality was the only
means by which Jessup was able to agree with the majority
of the Court. Jessup, however, never specified what
percentage of the outstanding shares of the company Belgium
would have had to identify as belonging to its nationals
before it could have a right of diplomatic protection.
The problem before the Court in Barcelona Traction
was to fashion a rule which would provide an adequate
degree of protection for corporations lacking in unity
of nationality among its owners, headquarters, and operations.
Such a rule ideally would be easily applied and would permit
an accurate prediction of the outcome. The rule adopted
by the Court satisfied this latter goal, yet failed to
establish a minimum standard of protection for the shareholders
of foreign corporations. The Court recognized that the rule
which it was adopting was a synthesis of the independent
juridical personality and nationality of a corporation and
the rule of international law that a nation may represent a
claim only on behalf of its nationals. Because this synthesis
evolves from an abstraction and a generalization, its
foundation is tenuous and must be modified by equitable
principles in order to avoid injustice. The decision of
the Court and the separate opinions of several judges differed
on the matter of creating an exception for the situation in
which a significant number of shareholders are nationals of a
state other than the state of incorporation. The Court
apparently felt that whatever injustice this exception might
alleviate would be outweighed by the possible flood of
claims which would arise from every state having a shareholder who could qualify under the exception. The separate
opinions indicated that the principles of equity should prevail.
A recent analysis of the practice of nations on this topic
reveals that there are essentially two policies: one,
recognition of a right of representation in the nation
possessing the real and serious seat of corporate control,
and two, flocation of the right only to the location of incorporation.
Yet, it was concluded after an examination of the
actual practices in the international community, that "[tihe
two policies are identical in that the result of each
is that there is some real connection between the
company and the protecting State beyond the formal link

28.

Harris, supra note 7, at 298-99.

of incorporation." 2 9 The author of this study has suggested
that the existing practices be revised either in accordance
with the rule of the Nottebohm Case or based upon a single
factor which would demonstrate the genuine connection sought
by the Nottebohm rule. Examples of this single factor are
the location of the seat of control, the nationality of the
majority of the shareholders, or the nationality of the
30
directors of the corporation.
Although any one of these revisions would detract from
the ease of predicting the right to represent a claim based
upon an injury to a corporation, the analysis required to
allocate the right would be only slightly more difficult than
that which the Court now conducts in determining the
nationality of a naturalized person, and probably no more
difficult than the current international practice of
determining the true nationality of a ship flying a flag of
convenience. 3 1 The rule adopted by the Court is designed to
minimize litigation before the I.C.J. and to facilitate
the determination of the existence of standing to sue in cases
which are presented to the Court. This goal of administrative
ease, however, was achieved at the cost of denying protection
to many shareholders who invest in a foreign corporation
which is later injured by a third nation.
The lack of harmony between the rule adopted by the
I.C.J. in the instant case and the actual practice of the
nations upon whose support the I.C.J. depends may
seriously decrease the utility of the court as an effective
forum for the settlement of disputes between nations.
Unfortunately, this may have the effect in some instances
of inhibiting international trade, although this projected
result probably overestimates the importance of the I.C.J.
as an effecutal stabilizing force in international relations.
A collateral consequence of this decision is the diminution
of respect for the Court after it took the better part of
a decade in order to dismiss the case on what one of
the judges described as a technicality. The obvious

29. Harris, supra note 7, at 310.
30. Harris, supra note 7, at 315-16.
31. G. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 91-92.
32. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Case, 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 227, 278 (1970)(Fitzmaurice, J., concurring).

consequence of this delay is that nations will have even
less motivation to pursue peaceful redress for alleged
wrongs before what is currently the only permanent
judicial body established for this purpose.

